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THE VIEW FROM THE TOP: HOW STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (SHRM) AFFECTS THE PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL
PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO) FIRMS
We study SHRM by taking an organizational level perspective on control over all employees.
Drawing from agency theory, control theory, and the resource-based view of the firm, we
develop hypotheses regarding the differential effects on firm performance of various overarching
approaches to human resource management (HRM) control implemented in small, growing
firms. We test our hypotheses in a longitudinal study of 342 firms that went public in 1993.
Results support the negative effect of bureaucratic HRM control on market-based measures of
performance, while firm-specific HRM control and incentive-based HRM control are related to
internal measures of firm growth.
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Today's fast-paced, competitive business environment has resulted in "rediscovery" of
the human resource management function as a group that may be able to enhance firm
competitiveness and performance by being "strategic" (Dyer & Kochan, 1995; Ulrich, 1997). The
potential contributions of strategic human resource management (SHRM) appear to emanate
from two perspectives. The first focuses on aligning human resource policies and procedures
with business or corporate strategies, and the second is an organizational level approach that
includes a senior HRM executive on the top management team who is in a position to influence
firm level business decisions. SHRM's potential benefits have led to its growing popularity
among practitioners and have prompted academics to pursue macro-oriented research that
applies firm level strategy models to HRM (Huselid & Becker, 1997; MacDuffie, 1995; Martell &
Carroll, 1995).
The results of the strategic HRM research have been impressive, with evidence
mounting that certain types of "employee friendly" human resource practices can have
significant effects on firm performance measures (e.g. Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995;
Huselid, Jackson & Schuler, 1997; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). The research conducted to
date tends to focus on the degree to which certain types of HRM practices (sometimes referred
to as bundles) directly affect firm performance or have an impact on performance through their
"fit" with the firm's strategy (Devanna, Fombrun & Tichy, 1984; Dyer, 1985; Miles & Snow, 1984;
Schuler, 1987). This "fit" perspective predominates despite the argument that the study of
SHRM might benefit most from the more strategic, organizational level perspective focused on
firm-level issues (Truss & Gratton, 1994; Wright & Snell, 1991).
It seems that although the goal of SHRM is to master the telescopic view (looking at the
business from a strategic or firm-level perspective), most SHRM research has involved mastery
of the microscope (studying specific combinations of HRM policies and procedures). Dyer and
Kochan (1995) in addressing the question "Is there a new HRM?," suggest that evaluations of
SHRM must begin with "a view from the top." They start with this perspective "because
strategies involve decisions about key goals, major policies, and resource allocations, (and)
they tend to be formulated, or at least blessed, at the top of organizations" (pg. 3). The strategy
process starts at the top of the organization, and in most cases, specific policies and procedures
(such as those involving specific human resource tactical areas such as selection, training, etc.)
follow the decisions made at the higher level of the organization. While much of the prior SHRM
research has focused on the combinations of policies and procedures, we hope to contribute to
the SHRM literature by studying the higher level decisions that might drive those. We refer to
this as the "view from the top" (borrowing from Dyer & Kochan, 1995).
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The "view from the top" allows us to investigate SHRM by defining it as the overarching
approach an organization takes toward control of its employees.1 Decisions about HRM control
are made early in a firm's life cycle, they apply regardless of whether or not the firm has a formal
HRM department, and they constitute an important step in the SHRM process. As Snell (1992:
321) points out, "the distinctions between strategy, control, and human resources are becoming
less obvious (Goold & Quinn, 1990; Jaeger & Baliga, 1985)." Those distinctions are even less
obvious when focusing on control decisions in the early stages of a firm's life cycle when such
decisions might have a dramatic influence in shaping future strategy and employee relations.
In order to study SHRM from a more "telescopic" approach, we integrate three
organizational theories that address the relationship between HRM control and firm
performance. Specifically, we apply agency theory, control theory, and the resource-based vi w
of the firm (supplemented with work from the field of SHRM), to develop hypotheses on how the
three different types of HRM control should affect firm performance. The three forms of control
are bureaucratic HRM control, firm-specific HRM control, and incentive-based HRM control.
We address the overall HRM control question by studying how early decisions regarding
HRM control affect subsequent firm performance in a sample of young, growth-oriented firms. In
particular, we focus on initial public offering (IPO) firms. IPO firms are opportune for our more
"telescopic" approach because they are at earlier stages in their life cycles, are acquiring cash
to grow, and face higher risks due to being newer firms. As a result, IPO firms are likely to be
immediately and quite dramatically affected by their early HRM control decisions (Welbourne &
Andrews, 1996).
In addition to providing an opportune sample for studying the effect of HRM control on
firm performance, IPO firms are also of considerable interest to business professionals,
investors, and politicians. These companies have potential to affect shareholder wealth,
economic growth, job growth, innovation, and investment (Hornsby & Kuratako, 1990).
According to Shane (1996), newer entrepreneurial firms (of which IPO firms are a part) account
for 80% of the new jobs created in the United States. A recent Fortune article (Wyatt, 1996)
titled "America's amazing IPO bonanza" characterized the IPO market as "big, powerful... and
reinvigorating the U.S. economy." As a result, there has been increased interest in IPO firms,
and these newly public companies are closely watched by the financial community and by their
investors. In-depth analyses of their financial position and their progress in technology,
management, and product development are reported to investors (by both the company and the
investment bankers covering the firm). Thus, stock price, for newly public firms, is an overall
                                         
1 We refer to firm-level control over all employees as HRM control.
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measure of firm performance that represents a response to the firm's financial performance and
expert judgement of the company's potential.
Given the relevance of stock price as a measure of firm performance for IPO firms, we
think that it is a useful dependent variable for our research study. Therefore, we use three
dependent variables that focus on stock price growth after the IPO. In addition, given the
recognition of IPOs as potential catalysts for job and economic growth, we also consider three
measures of firm growth. By examining effects on a combination of market-based dependent
variables and firm-based growth measures, we hope to be able to more fully test the
relationship between early HRM control form and firm performance.
To summarize, our study focuses on the effects of early HRM control decisions on
subsequent firm performance. By doing so, we expand the SHRM literature into two domains:
(1) the effect of HRM control, viewed from the top, rather than HRM policies and procedures on
firm performance, and (2) the study of SHRM in small, young, growth-oriented firms. We also
extend the agency and control theory literatures by merging concepts from the resource-bas d
view of the firm and introducing a third form of control, which we call firm-specific control. The
results of this work have implications not only for SHRM but also for the fields of
entrepreneurship, small business management, and organization theory.
A VIEW OF CONTROL FROM THE TOP
The concept of control is "at once the essential problem of management and
organization and the implicit focus of much of organization studies" (Pfeff r, 1997: 100). This
can be no truer than for managing people in organizations. Human resource management is
largely a matter of control; its primary objective is to control employee behaviors so as to elicit
desired outcomes that are consistent with the objectives of the organization (Schuler, 1989).
Furthermore, control is an issue that is, first and foremost, addressed "from the top" of the
organization, and the decisions that a firm makes regarding overall HRM control early in its life
cycle are likely to dramatically influence its future performance (Snell & Youndt, 1995; Stace &
Dunphy, 1991). In our sample of IPO firms, we argue that decisions about HRM control are
reflected by where in the organization the HRM function reports and by whether or not firms
have incentive programs for all employees. These are indicators of the overarching strategies of
control over all employees that firms might implement.
Multiple theoretical perspectives contribute to our understanding of control over all
employees. Specifically, application of agency theory, organizational control theory and the
resource-based view of the firm, in conjunction with arguments from the strategic HRM
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literature, yields three forms of control that we hypothesize will have differential effects on firm
performance. We refer to these three forms of control as bureaucratic HRM control, firm-specific
HRM control and incentive-based HRM control. Two forms, bureaucratic HRM control and
incentive-based HRM control, emerge from well-established literatures in agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and organizational control theory (Ouchi, 1979, 1980) and have
been investigated simultaneously in prior empirical studies (e.g. Ei enhardt, 1985, 1989; Snell,
1992).
Bureaucratic HRM control focuses on controlling behaviors through bureaucratic
mechanisms, and incentive-based HRM control focuses on using outcome-based incentives to
align employee goals with those of the organization. For our purposes, bureaucratic HRM
control is suggested by having a human resource function "buried" in an administrative
department, and incentive-based HRM control is indicated by having various organizational
incentive programs for all employees. The third form, which we call firm-specific HRM control, is
indicated by the SHRM literature (e.g. Martell & Carroll, 1995) and supported by the
resource-based view of the firm (Barney & Ouchi, 1986). We argue that firm-specific control
exists when a senior level HRM manager is part of the executive team.
Bureaucratic HRM Control
Both agency theory and organizational control theory contribute to our conceptualization
of bureaucratic HRM control. Agency theory is used to understand how alternative control forms
work to reduce conflicts of interest that inevitably arise when principals (i.e. managers) delegate
responsibility to agents (i.e. employees) (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One
alternative available to managers is to closely 'monitor' the behaviors of employees (e.g. hire
supervisors to directly observe and control employee actions). Similarly, organizational theorists
(e.g. Edwards, 1979; Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Thompson, 1967) suggest that 'bureaucratic control'
establishes compliance with rules, routines, and policies in order to elicit and maintain
appropriate employee behavior.
The underlying premises of bureaucratic control, as suggested by agency theory and
control theory, remain the private domain of the traditional HRM function. Although the field of
HRM is changing dramatically and attempting to move in a more strategic direction, many HRM
organizations remain bureaucratic in nature. Beer (1997: 51) suggests that the HRM function
has traditionally been concerned with administrative activities and garnering power by "ensuring
compliance." The HRM function ensures compliance by creating and enhancing bureaucracy
through its administration of performance appraisal, job analysis, job evaluation, human
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resource audits, job postings, and through its establishment and formalization of policy and
procedure handbooks. This traditional "policing" role of the HRM group serves to minimize
uncertainty and to establish predictable routines for employees (Snell &Youndt, 1995) and
results in numerous bureaucratic systems that require administration and maintenance
(Edwards, 1979).
Bureaucratic HRM control can be very costly to organizations, particularly for our sample
of small, growing firms. First, there are direct costs associated with implementation and
maintenance of bureaucratic personnel systems (Jones & Wright, 1992). Second, there may be
significant indirect costs associated with information asymmetries and inabilities to cope with
environmental uncertainties. Consistent with agency theory, costs arise from agents (i.e.
employees) having information that is not available to principals (i.e. managers), and yet
bureaucratic systems often are not designed to facilitate the transfer of information between
agent and principal. In addition to impeding information sharing, bureaucratic systems,
specifically designed to eradicate uncertainty and routinize employee behavior, result in
"unenthusiastic, purely compliant responses" from employees (Ouchi, 1979: 841). As Lado and
Wilson (1994: 715) point out, bureaucratic HR systems "may lead to the development of core
organizational rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992), to what Gouldner (1954) referred to as 'rule
tropism' (or the tendency for employees to do things strictly 'by the book') and to de-skilling and
demoralization of employees (Kanter, 1986; Morgan, 1986). According to Morgan (1986)
mechanistic approaches (such as a control-based HR strategy) may produce dysfunctional
effects, including the dehumanization of employees, and may cause organizational members to
pursue their own self-interests at the expense of organizational goals."
These ill effects of bureaucratic HRM control are likely to be especially salient for firms
facing high environmental uncertainty and resource scarcity. Under such conditions, firms
require that employees participate fully with one another to pursue innovative solutions to the
firm's real and rapidly changing problems (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Instead, bureaucratic HRM
control achieves predictable employee behavior at the expense of exceptional individual efforts
and performances that are the hallmarks of prosperous entrepreneurial firms (Edwards, 1979).
Within our sample of IPO firms, we suggest that bureaucratic HRM control exist when the HRM
function is found to be part of an administrative department within the firm. This is consistent
with Mohrman, Lawler, and McMahan's (1996: 81) observation that "the HR function has been
largely an administrative one headed by individuals whose roles are largely in cost control and
administrative activities." Thus, we expect that choosing to approach human resource
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management through bureaucratic means at the time of the IPO will have negative effects on
the firm's later performance.
Hypothesis 1: Bureaucratic human resource management control (evident when the
function is 'buried' in an administrative department) at the time of the IPO will have a
negative effect on subsequent firm performance.
Firm-Specific HRM Control
Agency theory, control theory, and prior work in strategic HRM can be used to
hypothesize as to the negative effect of bureaucratic HRM control on firm performance in small,
growing firms; however, the negative view of bureaucratic control is fairly simplistic and
incomplete. Edwards (1979) and, more recently, Adler and Borys (1996) suggest that
bureaucratic control might have either negative or positive ramifications. These two competing
faces of bureaucratic control are reflected in Walton's (1985) Control and Commitment model of
strategic HRM which is the basis of much of the empirical SHRM research that finds positive
effects of commitment-based bureaucratic HR mechanisms on performance (e.g. Arthur, 1994;
MacDuffie, 1995). Therefore, to hypothesize only that bureaucratic HRM control will have
negative effects on firm performance in our sample of IPO firms would be inadequate.
The SHRM literature and the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney &
Ouchi, 1986) suggest a form of control that is consistent with Adler and Borys' (1996)
description of 'enabling bureaucracy.' Whereas having the HRM function 'buried' in an
administrative department is likely to reflect a stifling form of bureaucratic control, a senior
executive responsible for the HRM function might enable the firm to create value through people
and to enhance the firm's competitive advantage. We call this form of control firm-specific HRM
control and explore its development more closely.
The strategic HRM literature points to the ability of the high ranking executive to create
systems and programs that "fit" the organization's strategy (Jackson, Schuler & Rivero, 1989;
Miles & Snow, 1984). However, the contingency or fit perspective of strategic HRM is, to date, a
conceptual argument that has not received overwhelming support (Becker & G rhart, 1996,
Delery & Doty, 1996). This may be due to the fact that the research focus has been on policies
and procedures rather than on more macro, overarching business issues. For example, any
attempt to design HRM policies and procedures to "fit" business strategy within our samples of
IPO firms could be easily undermined by the continuous change that fast growing firms
experience. "Fit" could, in fact, be associated with rigidity and inflexibility that could impair an
organization's ability to respond to external crises (Truss & Gratton, 1994). Therefore, the
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concept of "fit" between policies and procedures and business strategy seems to be more
characteristic of bureaucratic HRM control (at least for firms facing high uncertainty) and less
important than creating an overall approach to people management that supports the business.
This is where the strategic perspective of viewing HRM "from the top" becomes
important. Many researchers argue that HRM will become more strategic, in part, by
establishing a long-term focus and a tighter linkage betwe n HRM and strategic processes;
however, only by having an HR executive who assumes the role of "strategic partner" and has a
position on the top management team, will HRM achieve its "strategic" focus (Dyer & Kochan,
1995; Martell & Carroll, 1995; Mohrman et al., 1996). Consistent with the arguments of SHRM
scholars, having an executive on the top management team who understands the ways in which
the "people issues" should and can be integrated into business decision making may provide
unique benefits to the firm. Unfortunately, because much of the SHRM literature focuses on
HRM policies and procedures, it is limited in its ability to explain the performance effect of this
type of firm-specific control.
Our understanding of the performance effects of firm-specific HRM control is enhanced
by the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991). SHRM researchers (i.e. Jackson &
Schuler, 1995; Wright & McMahan, 1992) enthusiastically endorse its application as a means of
understanding the contribution of strategic HRM to firm performance. The resource-based vi w
states that a firm can obtain long-term sustained competitive advantage through the acquisition
and retention of resources that are valuable, rare and difficult for competitors to imitate (Wright
& McMahan, 1992). Furthermore, the entire employee population may be a source of sustained
competitive advantage (Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams, 1994) implying the importance of
developing effective mechanisms of control that support firm strategy. Human resource
management policies and procedures may be easily imitated; in fact, companies spend
considerable amounts of money doing benchmark studies and hiring consultants to copy
practices that have been found to be effective. Unlike policies and practices, which are
replicable, forms of overall organization control that are developed and cultivated by the top
management team are likely to be firm-specific thereby making them valuable, rare and
inimitable.
We propose that firm-specific control, achieved by HRM executive involvement in the top
management team leads to an integration of HRM control with the overall objectives of the
organization, and that it is this high level HR involvement that can produce a sustained
competitive advantage. This occurs in two ways: (1) by integrating people issues into firm-
specific, business decisions that then focus attention on ALL of the firm's resources (capital,
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financial, and people) and (2) by creating a more complete top management team (Chaganti &
Chaganti, 1983; Roure & Kelley, 1990). Essentially, if employees are indeed a critical resource
that can provide sustained competitive advantage (Lado & Wilson, 1994), then expertise in
controlling the employee resource is as important to a firm's future performance as skill in
controlling finance, marketing, or research.
Hypothesis 2: Firm-specific human resource management control (evident when a senior
human resource management executive is part of the top management team) at the time
of the IPO, will have a positive effect on subsequent firm performance.
Incentive-Based HRM Control
As our perspective is the "view from the top," we are not focusing on the characteristics
of various types of incentives (e.g. the degree to which they fit the overall HRM strategy, the mix
of incentive vs. fixed pay, etc.). Instead, we consider the existence of organizational-based
incentives for all employees as one HRM control choice. Thus, the question we investigate is
the effect of the existence of incentive-bas d compensation on firm performance in a sample of
IPO firms. Agency theorists (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and organizational theorists (e.g.
Eisenhardt, 1989; Ouchi, 1980) point to the effectiveness of incentive-based forms of control for
ensuring alignment of employee goals with organizational goals and thereby eliciting behaviors
that are in the best interests of the firm. Anderson and Oliver (1987: 79) comment that "agency
theory is concerned with the design of control systems that realign the incentives of both
principals and agents so that both parties desire the same outcome."
The agency theory concept of alignment is consistent with findings from the
compensation literature and from motivation theory, specifically goal setting research. In their
meta-analytic review of the litera u e, O'Leary-Kelly, Martoccio, and Frink (1994) confirm the
synergistic effect that group goals have on increasing group performance. According to Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin (1992: 253), "organizational performance does not result from the simple
additive function of the performance of its individual members and units. Rather, it derives from
a complex, synergistic interrelation of component parts." Moreover, Gerhart Trevor, and
Graham (1996) argue that synergistic behavior is critical for sustaining long-term competitive
advantage. In reviewing implications of the resource-bas d theory of the firm for understanding
compensation system effectiveness, Gerhart et al. (1996) note that at the heart of sustained
competitive advantage for the firm (which ultimately predicts firm performance) is "the
complicated nature of resource interdependencies (i.e. synergies), rather than the advantage
driven by a solitary resource." Thus, organizational-based incentive systems have the potential
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to result in employee behavior that creates the type of synergy that can lead to long-term firm
performance gains.
Agency theory suggests that high risk firms will most benefit from implementing
compensation systems that align the interests of employees with those of the owners (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). This conclusion is supported by work in the areas of
strategic human resource management and compensation. For example, Miles and Snow
(1984) suggest that prospector firms, which are characterized as higher risk organizations (e.g.
changing products and markets, fast growth) should be more effective when the total
compensation package places a heavy emphasis on incentives. Schuler (1987) proposes that
entrepreneurial firms, which are described as younger and facing higher risks, should use
long-term incentive programs. He specifically notes that by using this type of incentive system,
the company should "stimulate and reinforce risk taking, and willingness to assume
responsibility for a longer-t m orientation" (1987: 10). The findings of Gerhart and Milkovich
(1990: 685) support this argument; they suggest that "making many employees eligible for
long-term incentives is associated with high organizational performance in the long run."
In a study of compensation conducted within a sample of high technology firms, Balkin
and Gomez-Mejia (1987) find that organizationally-based incentive compensation is most
effective for smaller, growing firms. They speculate that the positive effects are due not only to
the employee alignment benefit but also to the fact that these firms incur lower costs by using
incentives. Those lower costs (because a payout only occurs after performance goals are
achieved) allow the smaller firms to compete with larger companies, thus enhancing their overall
performance. This finding is confirmed in a later study by Gomez-Mejia (1992). He shows, using
different types of classification schemes, that prospector (using the Miles and Snow, 1984
typology) and smaller firms benefit from pay plans that include organization-based ncentives.
Lastly, in a study of IPO firm survival, Welbourne and Andrews (1996) find support for
the relationship between organizationally-based incentives (such as profit sharing and stock
plans) and firm survival. They applied concepts from the population ecology literature,
suggesting that organization-based incentive systems encourage collective action among
employees, which ultimately enhances firm performance.
Thus, from a number of theoretical perspectives, including agency theory, goal setting
theory, the resource-based view of the firm, population ecology, and organizational control
theory, there is support for the relationship between adoption of orga izationally-based incentive
programs for all employees and firm performance. The effect should be particularly evident in
samples of higher risk firms, such as IPO organizations, where convergence of goals and
The View from the Top WP 97-27
Page 12
sharing of information is critical. As Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995: 18) noted in their
study of high performance organizations "basing rewards on organization performance is one
way to ensure that employees are involved in and care about the performance of the company."
Hypothesis 3: Incentive-based HRM control (evident when the firm offers organizational
incentives to all employees) at the time of the IPO will have a positive effect on
subsequent firm performance.
METHODS
The research strategy involves examining a sample of IPO firms that went public in 1993
and replicating that study with a smaller sample of firms that went public in 1988. We obtain an
extensive profile of each firm at the time it goes public and then examine how those initial
factors obtained at time 1 (the time of the IPO) affect the subsequent firm performance. When a
company goes public, it is required to provide extensive information on not only its financial
position, but also its internal structure, to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the
general public. That information is described in the firm's prospectus. We use the archival data
available in the prospectus to capture the types of control forms that were being used at the
time of the IPO. Then, after controlling for factors that are thought to be related to firm
performance, we analyze the impact of the various HRM control forms (as detailed in the
hypotheses) on multiple market-based measures and internal measures of firm growth.
We began the study with 535 companies that went public during 1993. A total of 706
firms went public during that year, and 585 of those companies produced a good or service
(excluding real estate trusts, etc.). We were able to obtain the prospectuses for 535 of those
organizations. For analysis purposes, we limited the sample to those companies that had at
least 50 and fewer than or equal to 10,000 employees. Thi  does three things: (1) it eliminates
the outliers; (2) it limits the sample to those firms that are subject to most of the significant
employment law (e.g. Title VII, The Family and Medical Leave Act, etc.); and (3) it eliminates
very small organizations (fewer than 50 employees) where decisions about control over all
employees may not yet have been formalized. In addition, we only ran the analyses on firms for
which we could obtain stock price data for year-end 1996; thus, the final sample sizfor
analysis purposes is 342.
Data Collection and Coding
The primary data source was the prospectus of each firm. The prospectus is the
document provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to the public
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offering, and it is also the document circulated by the underwriter to assess demand for the
firm's stock. The SEC requires that firms follow strict guidelines in the format. In fact, the firm is
legally liable for any information that might mislead investors (O'Flaherty, 1984). As noted by
Beatty and Zajac (1994), top management is accountable to the SEC and to stockholders
regarding the contents of the prospectus. The Securities Act of 1933 sets the requirements for
the prospectus, thus assuring consistency in the type of information that is included in the
document. The typical prospectus writing process involves at least three lawyers (one for the
company and one for each of the investment bankers), two investment banking firms, and at
least one certified public accountant. Each party has a vested interest in providing the public
with an honest view of the company. Thus, we can be reasonably assured that the prospectus is
a useful data source (Marino, Castaldi, & Dollinger, 1989).
Our coding strategy was developed and refined based on earlier research on IPO firms
(see method used by Welbourne and Andrews, 1996). Code sheets and a coding handbook
were given to each coder after each individual attended an initial training session. A total of five
coders worked on the 1993 data. In addition, weekly meetings were held with coders to address
problems and/or inconsistencies in the prospectuses. Finally, we randomly cross-coded
prospectuses (every 10th prospectus). For the variables used in this study, agreement was 90%
or higher among the coders. Financial data were also obtained from COMPUSTAT, Going
Public: The IPO Reporter (for financial data at the time of the IPO), and from a database
obtained from the Securities Data Corporation.
Sample Characteristics
At the time of its IPO, the average firm in the 1993 sample (n=342) was 8.21 years old
(s.d. 0.42) and employed 911 people (s.d. 1,384). The median firm was 6 years old and
employed 341 people. On average, net profit per share was $0.30 (s.d. $ .59) and initial
offering price per share was $12.13 (s.d. $5.03). Using the classification scheme reported by the
Small Business Administration to determine industry, the sample's highest concentration of firms
was in manufacturing (46.6%). A total of 20% of the firms were in service industries, while 5.5%
were in wholesale trade, 10% in transportation and/or communications, and 9.7% in retail trade.
Other industries include .2% in agriculture, 3% in mining, 1.5 % in construction, and 3.2% in
health care and financial services. Table 1 provides a summary of the means and standard
deviations for variables used in the analyses.
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TABLE 1
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS






Company age in years 8.21 6.00 .42
Net profit per share .30 .35 .59
Number of employees 911 341 1,384
Risk factors (number of) 3.58 4.00 1.46
Initial stock price 12.13 10.00 5.03
Adjusted initial stock price 10.74 12.00 5.02
HR function reports to VP of
administration
.04 Yes = 12 or 4% .18
HR function reports to the VP of
Human Resource Mgt.
.09 Yes = 32 or 9% .29
HR function reports to other VP in
executive team
.11 Yes = 38 or 11% .31
Incentive stock option plan for all
employees
.37 Yes = 126 or 37% .48
ESOP for all employees .07 Yes = 23 or 7% .25
Stock purchase plan for all ees. .28 Yes = 96 or 28% .45
Profit sharing for all ees. .12 Yes = 42 or 12% .33
Beta, 1995 .96 1.07 1.10
Beta, 1996 .86 .86 .89
Union .23 Yes = 80 or 23% .42
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Independent Variables
"The View from the Top." We used archival data, rather than survey data, to obtain our
measures of HRM control "from the top." Because we did not want to limit our sample only to
those firms with formal human resources departments, a research strategy different from what is
traditionally done in the strategic HRM field was necessary. Specifically, we searched the
prospectuses for two indicators of high-level approaches to control over all employees. The first
indicator of control over the entire employee population is the reporting of responsibility for the
"human resource" function by a member of the top management team. Thus, we examined the
management section of the prospectus to determine who on the top management team was
responsible for human resource management. The second  indicator of control "from the top" is
the type of incentive systems in place for all employees.2
Bureaucratic and Firm-specific HRM Control. We searched the prospectus for indicators
of top management responsibility for the HRM function as measures of bureaucratic HRM
control and firm-specific HRM control. The prospectus provides the reader with a listing of
everyone in the top management team and a summary of the departments and/or functions that
report to that individual. We coded the representation of human resource management on the
top management team in one of four different ways. The function could either: (1) report to the
Vice President of Administration or another executive who had "Administration" as part of
his/her job title (e.g. Chief Administration Officer); (2) be represented by a Vice President of
Human Resources who reported directly to the CEO or President; (3) report to another member
of the top management team (in most cases this was the Chief Financial Officer); or (4) not be
discussed in the management section at all.
We consider HRM control to be bureaucratic when the function reports to a VP of
Administration. When HRM is one of the many administrative functions (e.g. supervising the
secretarial staff, purchasing, etc.) for which the VP of Administration is responsible, HRM control
is likely to be consistent with Mohrman, Lawler, and McMahan's (1996) characterization of HR
as highly administrative and bureaucratic. Alternatively, HRM control is firm-specific when a
company reports having a VP of Human Resources. Martell and Carroll (1995) argue that the
presence of an HRM executive on the top management team facilitates integration between
HRM and firm strategy. This is consistent with a "firm-specific" approach that might lead to a
sustained competitive advantage. When another member of the top management team (e.g. the
CFO or VP of Quality) has responsibility for HRM control, classification as either bureaucratic or
                                         
2 In this paper, we do not provide details regarding validity of these measures; however, confirming evidence of the
measures can be found in Cyr and Welbourne (1997).
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firm-specific is much harder to determine. While it may be that HRM will be treated
bureaucratically, as just another responsibility on the already full plate of that executive, it also
may be the case that HRM control will emerge as firm- pecific. For example, it may be perfectly
appropriate for the CFO, who might best understand the objectives and human resource
requirements of the business, to be responsible for HRM control. Thus, we consider
examination of this type of HRM control as exploratory.
Unfortunately, responsibility for HRM is not reported in all of the prospectuses. This lack
of HRM in our coding scheme does not necessarily mean that HRM, as an activity, does not
exist within the IPO firm. For example, the firm may have a secretary to the CFO performing
what would be called HRM activities (e.g. payroll), or each individual manager may be assuming
responsibility for HRM activities. Instead, our coding scheme captures whether the top
management team considers HRM to be a function that merits mentioning when they describe
the company in the prospectus. This is consistent with our "view from the top." We are not
interested in the specific ways in which the firm conducts its HRM activities (i.e. the policy and
procedure approach), but rather in the overall approach to HRM control and its characterization
as either bureaucratic or firm-specific.
A total of 82 firms (24%) indicated having a human resource function reporting to a
member of the top management team. A total of 12 companies were coded as having
bureaucratic HRM control (i.e. they reported having the Vice President of Administration
responsible for HRM activities). Thirty-two firms (9%) were coded as using firm-specific HRM
control (i.e. they had a Vice President of HRM who reported directly to the CEO). In addition, 38
organizations (11%) had an HRM function that reported to a specific operating executive (in
most cases the CFO, but in a few other instances, HRM reported to the Chief Legal Officer, VP
of Quality, or other functional area VP).
Incentive alignment. As noted by Becker and Olson (1989), stock plans and profit
sharing are mechanisms for increasing alignment among all employees within an organization.
Additionally, Lawler t. al. (1995), in their study of high performance organizations, found that
profit sharing and stock ownership programs were the forms of compensation most likely to be
available to all employees. These programs provide individual employees with incentives to
work toward the organization's goals in the same way that executive bonus plans provide
incentives for executives to make decisions that will support the interests of stockholders or
owners.
Therefore, we searched the prospectus for data on the existence of profit sharing and
various types of stock ownership programs. We coded the number of firms that had incentive
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stock options (ISOs), stock purchase plans, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and
profit sharing for ALL employees. A total of 126 firms (37%) indicated they had incentive stock
option plans for all employees, 96 companies (28%) had stock purchase plans for all
employees, 23 firms (7%) had employee stock ownership plans, and 42 (12%) firms had profit
sharing. We coded the variables as "1" if the company had the program in place for all
employees at the time of the IPO and "0" if they either did not have such a program or
implemented it only for key executives. Because the focus of our study is on control over all
employees, we limit the variables to those that affect the entire employee population.
Dependent Variables
A combination of market-based performance measures and internal measures of firm
growth will provide a comprehensive test of our hypotheses; therefore, we investigate the
effects of HRM control on multiple measures of each. Given that the prime reason investors
choose to put money into an IPO is to make money when the firm's stock price increases over
time, we examined three different measures related to stock price growth. This is consistent with
recommendations of researchers who suggested future strategic HRM studies should include
measures of shareholder wealth and stock price (Abowd, Milkovich & Hannon, 1990; Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1990). In addition, market-based measures represent the most prevalent and relevant
firm performance measures in the IPO literature (see Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995 for a review).
The three capital market measures are:
· Percentage change in stock price (adjusted for splits) from the time of the IPO to year-end
1996.
· Percentage change in Tobin's Q (calculated as stock price per share / book value per share)
from the time of the IPO to year- nd 1996.
· Percentage change in total market value (shares outstanding * price per share) from the
time of the IPO to year-end 1996.
A primary purpose of the IPO is to obtain resources for future growth; therefore we examine
three measures of firm growth from the time of the IPO through year-end 1995.3 Although
accounting measures of performance (e.g. ROA, ROE) are susceptible to varying accounting
methods and to manipulation (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993), earnings per share projections and
announcements are followed closely by analysts and are considered an important measure of
the firm's progress. Sales growth is also a well-established indicator of firm performance among
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IPO firms (Fox, 1997; Hoy, McDougall, & Dsouza, 1992). Finally, IPO firms provide tremendous
opportunity for job creation and economic growth (Asquith & Weston, 1994). Therefore, we
measure the effects of HRM control on the following three indicators of firm growth:
· Percentage change in earnings per share (EPS) from the time of the IPO to year-end 1995.
· Percentage change in sales from IPO to year-end 1995.
· Percentage change in total number of employees from IPO to year-end 1995.
Control Variables
Several control variables, selected based on reviews of both the strategic human resource
management and initial public offering literatures (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Huselid, 1995;
Welbourne & Andrews, 1996) were used in the analyses. The total number of employees,
logged to correct for skewness, was included as a measure of size. Net profit per share at the
time of the IPO was added as a performance measure. Company age (calculated as 1993
minus year incorporated) was also included as a control variable because much of the literature
on life indicates that the presence of a human resource function is related to company age (e.g.
Baird and Meshoulam, 1988). In addition, we coded whether the firm was unionized or not. We
thought that this was an important control because a union presence may affect management
actions affecting control over employees (Hu elid, Jackson, & Schuler, 1997). Nine industry
dummy codes were created, based on categories reported by the Small Business
Administration, and used in the analyses.
Although our sample of IPO firms consists of firms that are considered to be higher risk
investments than companies currently in the public market (due to their having no prior stock
price history), we expect that each firm will be subject to varying degrees of risk. Therefore, an
additional control variable (logged) indicates the level of risk faced by each firm. Each
prospectus contains a section listing all risk factors faced by the firm. These risk factors must be
disclosed to meet the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The presence
of the following risk factors were included in this measure: new product, few or limited products,
limited number of years in operation, inexperienced management, technical risk, seasonality,
customer dependence, supplier dependence, inexperienced underwriters, competition, legal
proceedings against company, liability, and government regulation. The summated risk measure
ranged from 0 to 9, with a mean of 3.58 and a standard deviation of 1.46. Prior research on
initial public offering firms found that this measure was a useful way to code risk (Beatty and
Zajac, 1994; Rasheed and Datta, 1994). Finally, to control for the firm's sensitivity to overall
                                                                                                                              
3 Year-end 1996 accounting data were not yet available from COMPUSTAT.
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market movements, we included beta (obtained from COMPUSTAT for the periods ending
December 1995 and 1996) as a measure of systematic risk.
RESULTS
Table 2 includes the correlations for the variables in the analyses. Bureaucratic HRM
control as measured by having a VP of Administration responsible for HRM is negatively related
to all three measures of market performance: stock price growth, change in Tobin's Q and
growth in market value. Interestingly, though not significant, bureaucratic HRM control is also
consistently and negatively related to each form of incentive-based HRM control. Firm-specific
HRM control through a VP of HRM or an 'other' operating VP is positively associated with
growth in earnings per share from the time of the IPO through 1995. The relationships between
incentive-based HRM control and firm performance are not as distinct. Having a stock purchase
plan for all employees is positively related to growth in number of employees whereas profit
sharing is negatively associated with growth in earnings per share.
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TABLE2
CORRELATIONS FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. VP of Admin. 1.00
2. VP of HRM .10 1.00
3. Other VP -.07 -.05 1.00
4. Incentive stock option -.05 .03 .08 1.00
5. Stock purchase plan -.08 .00 .09 .12 1.00
6. E~SOII -.05 -.01 -.02 -.01 .25 1.00
7. Profit sharin2 -.07 .00 -.05 -.08 .10 .29 1.00
8. Company age .11 -.01 .01 .06 -.08 -.04 .003 1.00
9. Number of employees .07 .23 -.10 -.14 -.04 -.03 .009 .04 1.00
10. Union .08 .11 -.06 -.16 -.08 -.09 -.02 -.05 .47 1.00
11. Risk factors .02 -.15 .15 .09 -.04 -.05 -.06 -.02 -.33 -.16 1.00
12. Beta for 1996 -.05 -.05 -.02 .08 -.01 .02 .03 .01 -.11 -.08 .15 1.00
13. Net profit per share .06 .06 -.03 -.13 -.05 -.01 .16 .18 .25 .16 -.17 -.07 1.00
14. Percentage change in .004 .09 .16 .03 .04 -.04 -.12 -.02 .02 .13 .06 .16 -.25 1.00
Earnings per share (lP0 to
12/95)
15. Percentage change in -.13 -.06 .02 .02 -.03 -.06 .05 -.04 -.19 .04 .06 .28 -.08 .06 1.00
Tobin's Q (lPO to 12/96)
16. Percentage change in total
Market value (lPO to 12/96) -.12 -.002 .01 .01 -.03 .03 .03 -.03 -.02 -.004 .05 .22 .03 .11 .57 1.00
17. Percentage change in
Adjusted stock price (lPO to -.10 .04 .01 .04 -.002 -.03 .04 .01 .10 .04 .01 .24 .12 .15 .58 .91 1.00
12/96)
18. Percentage change in sales
(IPO to 12/95). -.04 -.06 -.01 .05 -.01 .02 -.07 -.12 -.03 -.09 .03 .06 -.17 .11 -.03 -.08 -.09 1.00
19. Percentage change in
Number of employees (lPO to
12/95) -.06 -.05 .07 .02 .13 .05 -.02 .02 -.13 -.03 .04 .01 .06 .05 .11 .24 .29 -.21 1.00
All correlations about .08 are significant at the .10 level; above .10 are significant at the .05 level, above .12 are significant at .01 level, and above
.17 are significant at the.001 level.
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Tests of Hypotheses
We tested the hypotheses by running a series of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression equations. Each equation included all of the control variables and the independent
variables of interest and predicted a different dependent variable. Table 3 summarizes the
results of the models to predict the market-bas d measures of firm performance (i.e. change in
stock price, Tobin's Q, and total market value). Each of the equations is significant at the 0.01
level, with the R2 ranging from .12 to .14.
Hypothesis 1, that bureaucratic HRM control will have a negative effect on firm
performance, is supported for each of the market-bas d measures. When HRM reports to the
Vice President of Administration, there is a significant and negative effect in all three equations.
The unstandardized beta coefficients range from a high of -.74 for adjusted stock price growth to
-.19 for percentage change in Tobin's Q. These analyses provide consistent support for the
harmful effects of bureaucratic HRM on capital market measures of firm performance. Neither
firm-specific HRM control nor incentive-based HRM control is significant in any of the equations
to predict market-based measures, indicating no support for hypotheses 2 and 3.
Table 4 includes the results of equations to predict internal measures of firm growth
(sales growth, change in number of employees, and earnings per share growth). For these
dependent variables, hypothesis 1 receives no support; bureaucratic HRM control through a VP
of Administration has no effect on measures of firm growth. Hypothesis 2 receives some
support; firm-specific HRM control through a VP of HR or an 'other' operating VP has a positive
effect on growth in earnings per share. Hypothesis 3 stated that incentive-based HRM control
would positively affect firm performance. The findings for hypothesis 3 are mixed; profit sharing
has a negative effect on sales growth, and having stock purchase plans for all employees has a
positive effect on percentage change in number of employees.
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TABLE 3
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR MARKET -RELATED VARIABLES (n=342)
Percentage change in stock price (IPO to year-end
1996)
Percentage change Tobin's Q (IPO to
year-end 96)
Percentage change in total














Company age .02 .08 .01 .02 -.01 .03
Number of
employees
11 + .06 -.04* .02 .01 .03
Risk factors .02 .05 -.003 .01 .02 .02
Net profit per share .24+ .12 -.01 .03 .05 .05
Union (0/1) -.05 .18 .09* .04 .02 .07
Beta, 96 .27*** .08 .06*** .02 .09** .03
VP of Admin. -.74* .36 -.19* .09 -.32* .14
VP of HRM .13 .23 -.003 .05 .05 .09
Other VP -.01 .21 -.01 .05 -.01 .09
Incentive stock
option for all
.11 .14 -.004 .03 .008 .06
Profit sharing
for all
.14 .21 .05 .05 .03 .09
Stock purchase
plan for all
.05 .15 -.03 .04 -.03 .06
ESOP
plan for all
-.24 .27 -.07 .07 .06 .11
R2 .13 .14 .12
F 2.19** 2.55*** 1.97**
*** p £ .001; ** p £ .01; * p £ .05, + = p £ .10 Note: Industry codes are included in the analyses.
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Table 4
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR FIRM GROWTH VARIABLES (n=342)
Percentage Change in Sales
(IPO to year-end 1995)
Percentage Change in Number
of Employees
(IPO to year-end 1995)
Percentage Change in
Earnings Per Share
(IPO to year-end 1995)
Variables Unstandardized
Beta
s.e. Beta s.e. Beta s.e.
Constant .46 .14 .09 .12 -.28 .44
Number of
employees
-.007 .02 -.02 .02
Company age -.04* .02 .004 .02 -.002 .03
Risk factors .003 .01 .02 .01 .01 .02
Net profit per
share
-.01 .03 .07* .03
Union (0/1) -.07+ .04 .003 .04 .15** .06
Beta, 95 .03* .02 .003 .01 .06** .02
VP of Admin. -.02 .09 -.09 .09 -.03 .12
VP of HRM -.08 .06 -.02 .06 .14t .08
Other VP .05 .05 .03 .06 .20** .07
Incentive stock
option for all
-.02 .03 .001 .04 .02 .05
Profit sharing
for all
-.09+ .05 -.03 .06 -.11 .07
Stock purchase
plan for all
.02 .04 .07+ .04 .02 .05
ESOP plan for
all
.02 .07 .02 .07 -.01 .10
R2 .13 .09 .11
F 2.27*** 1.61* 2.03**
*** p £ .001;  ** p £ .01;  * p £ .05; + = p £ .10     Note:  Industry codes are included in the analyses.
Replication of the Study
In order to supplement our findings, we ran similar analyses with a second cohort of IPO
firms (n=92) that went public in 1988. We were unable to completely replicate the analyses from
the 1993 study due to small sample size and missing data. For example, there were no vice
presidents of HRM who reported to the CEO; however, there were several Vice Presidents of
Administration or Vice Presidents of Finance and Administration who reported having
responsibility for HRM (n=22). Therefore, we could test the effect of bureaucratic HRM control,
but not firm-specific HRM control, on performance. In addition, we had data on the existence of
profit sharing, stock purchase plans, and incentive stock option plans for all employees. Thus,
we could also test the effect of incentive-bas d HRM control on firm performance.
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For purposes of replication, we limited our analyses of the effects of HRM control on
market-based measures to change in adjusted stock price (IPO to year-end 1991). The overall
equation to predict stock price growth was not significant; however, the initial equation
approaches significance (F = 1.49 and p < 0. 15) and the pattern of results, based on an
investigation of the unstandardized beta coefficients, was similar to that obtained in the 1993
study. To further explore these relationships, we conducted backward elimination regression
analyses to predict stock price growth. Backward elimination yields a single, "best" subset of
independent variables by beginning with a model containing all potential independent variables
and dropping predictors, on subsequent iterations, that do not meet a predetermined F value
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). Thus, each of the variables used in the previous analyses
are included in the equations.
The findings for the effect of bureaucratic HRM control on stock price growth are
consistent with those from the 1993 sample. The final iteration of the backward regression
yields an R1 of 0.07 (F =3.22, p £ 0.05), and has two predictors left in the equation, net profit per
share and the variable for bureaucratic HRM control. Having a VP of Administration has a
negative effect on stock price growth (unstandardized beta = -0.22, s.e. = 0.09, p £ .02). This
provides further support for our first hypothesis.
Similarly, the overall equations to examine the effects of HRM control on firm growth
measures were not significant, but the patterns of results suggested support of the 1993
findings. We again employed backward elimination analyses to more closely examine the
relationships. The final iteration to predict percentage change in number of employees from the
time of the IPO through 1991 yields an F of 4.47 (p £ 0.01). The only remaining variables in the
equation are the dummy for stock purchase plans (unstandardized beta = 11.73, s.e. = 4.48, p £
0.01) and company age (unstandardized beta = -0.15, s.e. = 0.07, p £ 0.05). In combination,
these two variables explain 9% of the variance in change in number of employees. The final
iteration to predict earnings per share growth yields only one significant predictor, the presence
of profit sharing for all employees. Profit sharing is a negative predictor (unstandardized beta =
-4.47, s.e. = 2.35, p £ 0.06) of earnings per share growth (R2 = 0.04, F = 3.63). The final
equation for change in sales was not significant.
In general, the results of the replication analyses are consistent with the findings in the
1993 sample. Again, we find support for the negative effect of bureaucratic HRM control on
stock price growth for the first three years following the IPO. The analyses also yield the mixed
results for the effects of incentive-based HRM control on measures of firm growth. As in the
1993 sample, stock purchase plans appear to be a positive predictor of percentage change in
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number of employees, but profit sharing has a negative effect on an important measure of firm
growth (in this case, earnings per share).
DISCUSSION
The goal of this research was to expand the strategic HRM literature by exploring
another dimension of strategic HRM, which we refer to as the "view from the top." This unique
view led us to consider the organizational control component of SHRM and how various forms
of HRM control affect firm performance. We took a somewhat different research strategy and
tested our hypotheses in a sample of younger, smaller, initial public offering firms. The results,
to some extent, suggest support for the hypotheses, although the data are not consistent across
dependent variables. In order to integrate our findings, we first review our results and then
combine them into an overall model. Next, we build propositions that link our results with
concepts from theory, and offer suggestions for future research based on the integrated model.
The Effects of HRM Control on Firm Performance
In each of the analyses that included a market-bas d measure of perfo mance, we found
that bureaucratic HRM control had a negative effect on firm performance. Similar results were
obtained in two separate longitudinal studies of IPO firms. In the 1993 sample, stock price
growth is lower for firms that have a VP of Administration who is responsible for the HRM
function. This finding was replicated with the 1988 sample. Thus, it seems that our studies
provide evidence in support of hypothesis one, which states that bureaucratic human resource
management control "from the top" (at the time of the IPO) will be negatively associated with the
firm's subsequent performance. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not supported for any of the market--
based measures of firm performance.
The mixed findings for the effects of HRM control on measures of firm growth in the
1993 study provide only partial support for hypotheses 2 and 3. Hypothesis 2, that firm-specific
HRM control would have a positive effect on firm performance, was supported only for earnings
per share growth. In addition to finding support for the positive effect of having a Vice President
of Human Resources, our results also show that HRM reporting to an operating VP has a
positive effect on earnings per share growth. Thus, it seems that firm-specific HRM control may
be obtained by either having a VP of HRM or an operating VP responsible for HRM. That
interpretation is consistent with our argument that firm-specific control exists when someone in
top management is integrating HRM decisions into business decisions.
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Hypothesis 3, that incentive-based HRM control would positively affect firm performance,
received mixed support. Stock purchase plans were positively related to change in number of
employees in both samples, while profit sharing was negatively related to change in sales in the
1993 sample and to earnings per share growth in the 1988 sample. Not only are the results
inconsistent in the direction of the relationship (profit sharing was negative while stock purchase
plans were positive), but the incentive systems predict different measures of firm growth. Given
our data, we cannot assess whether the relationship between specific type of incentive plan and
the particular growth term is systematic, perhaps representing an intentional firm strategy, or
driving a certain type of behavior that results in the performance effects we uncovered.
Additional research needs to be conducted to investigate that question.
It is interesting to note that the one incentive plan that is positively related to firm
performance is "voluntary." This result can be understood in the context of agency theory, which
also suggests areas for future research. The effect of incentive-based HRM control in aligning
interests of employees with those of the firm (and positively affecting firm performance) may be
a function of the risk bearing preferences of employees. Although a complete review of risk is
beyond the scope of this paper, our results do suggest an area for future research. Even though
risk sharing is often characterized in the agency theory and SHRM literatures as something that
is "good" for the organization (e.g. aligning interests of employees with those of owners), when
risk is transferred to employees, it may result in negative outcomes because individual
employees cannot diversify their risk portfolios (Bloom & Milkovich, 1997; Jensen & Murphy,
1990).
Stock purchase plans require that employees put some of their own income at risk;
money from their pay checks is used to purchase discounted shares of stock in the company.
However, the plan is voluntary. It could be that this form of incentive alignment works well for
sharing risk because each employee can decide whether some of his/her pay will be at risk.
Future research studying the reasons why employees participate in stock purchase plans and
the outcomes of their participation on individual behaviors would be particularly useful in further
understanding the implications of agency theory for risk sharing and risk bearing.
Model of HRM Control and Firm Performance
The overall results seem to indicate that both firm-specific and incentive-based HRM
control can have effects on internal measures of firm growth (earnings per share, sales, and
number of employees). In order to supplement our findings, we tested whether these three
measures of firm growth (through 1995) had an effect on overall stock price growth from the
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time of the IPO through 1996. Table 5 shows the results of the OLS regression analysis. The R2
for the equation is .22, and all measures of firm growth are significant and positive in predicting
change in adjusted stock price. It is interesting to note that firm-spec fic and incentive-based
HRM control can have a positive effect on measures of firm growth which, in turn, have a
positive effect on stock price growth. Furthermore, the negative effect of having a VP of
administration responsible for HRM continues to be significant even upon controlling for
important measures of firm growth.
Table 5
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR GROWTH MEASURES INCLUDED AS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (1993 AND 1988 COHORTS)
Percent Change in Stock Price
(IPO to year-end 1996)
1993 sample of IPO firms, n=342
Percent Change in Stock Price
(IPO to year-end 1991)
1988 sampel of IPO firms, n=92
Variables Unstandardized beta s.e. Unstandardized beta s.e.
Constant .82 1.22 .70 .22
% change in EPS .33* .16 .01** .003
% change in sales .43+ .24 .0005 .0002
% change in #ees .94*** .22 -.001 .003
Number of
employees
.16** .06 .02 .02
Company age -.01 .08 .002 .002
Risk factors .004 .05 .35 .23
Net profit per share .20+ .12 .03 .02
Union (0/1) -.13 .18 -.04 .09
Beta,96 .23** .07
VP of Admin. -.65* .34 -.20* .08
VP of HRM .12 .22
Other VP -.13 .20
Incentive stock
option for all
.11 .14 .03 .03
Profit sharing for all .24 20 -.03 .08
Stock purchase plan
for all
-.01 .08 -.07 .10
ESOP plan for all -.26 .27
R2 .22 .22
F 3.65*** 1.83*
*** p £ .001;  ** p £ .01;  * p £ .05; + = p £ .10
Note:  Industry codes are included in the analyses; for the 1988 study only one dummy code is included --
whether company is manufacturing or service.
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We replicated the analysis with the 1988 cohort of firms, predicting change in adjusted
stock price from IPO to year-end 1991. The equation has an R2 of .22 (F=1.83, p £ 05), and two
variables are significant at the p £ .05 level of analysis. The significant variables are growth in
earnings per share (unstandardized beta = 0.01) and bureaucratic HRM control (u standardized
beta = -0.20). Thus, with a second sample of IPO firms, representing a cohort of firms that
should be relatively more conservative due to the fact that they went public after the stock
market crash of 1987, we find a consistent pattern of results in that bureaucratic HRM is
negatively related to change in market-based measures of performance.
The results suggest that bureaucratic HRM control is the only HRM control variable that
directly affects change in stock price. After controlling for internal measures of firm growth
(percentage change in earnings per share, sales, and number of employees), this negative
relationship holds in two different cohorts of IPO firms.
Agency theory, control theory, and much of the literature in SHRM suggest that
bureaucratic HRM control can have a negative effect on firm performance because employees
may be constrained from taking advantage of opportunities; they may not be encouraged to take
prudent risks, and they may not share information. In addition to increasing agency costs, this
type of employee behavior is likely to lead to an organization that cannot change quickly. If
investors react negatively to firms that cannot or do not take advantage of new opportunities
(which should be particularly important for IPO firms), and bureaucratic HRM control negatively
affects the firm's ability to change, then it seems consistent with theory that bureaucratic HRM
control would be negatively related to the firm's stock price growth.
At the same time, we find that having firm-specific and incentive-based HRM control
does not directly affect market-based measures of perfo mance, but both control forms affect
internal growth measures, which then affect stock price growth. We speculate that both of these
forms of control create firm-specific resources that are not easily communicated or understood
by investors. In fact, these forms of HRM control should result in firm-spec fic competitive
advantage that an organization would not want to communicate. By not sharing firm-specific
decision patterns, the firm reduces the risk that competitors can copy their strategies, and the
firm retains its competitive advantage. This is one of the keys to enhancing long-term firm
performance according to the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wright &
McMahan, 1992).
In summary, the pattern of results seems consistent with agency theory, control theory,
and the resource-based view of the firm. Therefore, we suggest two general propositions for
future research. The first is that bureaucratic control inhibits a firm's ability to react quickly to
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change, and this inability to be flexible has a direct impact on market-based measures of firm
performance. The second proposition is that firm-specific and incentive-based HRM control
create firm-specific resources that are not easily understood by investors; therefore, no direct
effects on market-based measures of performance are expected. However, we do anticipate an
indirect effect through measures of firm growth (which are more easily communicated and
understood by investors). Figure 1 summarizes the relationships that we found in the data and
the propositions that we introduce.
We expect that firm-specific and incentive-based HRM control result in something that
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) refer to as structural cohesion. They define structural cohesion
as an "employee-generated synergy that propels a company forward" (pg. 896). We propose
that firm-specific HRM control results in HRM issues being integrated into general business
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decisions; this occurs because someone who has responsibility for the HRM function is part of
the business decision making process. This type of high level decision making results in
structural cohesion, which then creates firm-specific advantage.
At the same time, incentive-based HRM controls can either increase or decrease
structural cohesion. When the incentive plans optimize employee risk taking, structural cohesion
can increase. Alternatively, when risk taking is not optimized (e.g. employees are in a position to
maintain stability or don't react to new business conditions, etc.), then structural cohesion can
decrease. Whereas firm-specific HRM control starts with business decisions and assumes that
people issues are integrated into that decision making process, incentive-based HRM control
begin with the employees and can create an environment where employees take business
issues into account as they make decisions within their own jobs. Thus, both forms of HRM
control can affect structural cohesion, which in turn can impact firm growth measures. In
addition, we think that structural cohesion has the potential to directly affect market-based
measures of firm performance because it should lead to the firm's taking advantage of
opportunities and changing quickly and effectively. This type of analysis is beyond the scope of
our data and is something that needs to be addressed in future studies.
Limitations
Although we conducted two studies in an attempt to minimize the limitations of this
research, there are still issues that need to be considered when interpreting our data. First, our
focus "from the top" results in sacrificing the detail that is often present in other strategic HRM
studies. Our data do not include information about specific HRM practices that are enacted
when HRM reports through the VP of Administration, VP of HRM, or an operating VP. The
relationship between more traditional measures of HRM policies and procedures or work group
practices must be left for future research. Furthermore, we do not know the extent of employee
involvement in the various organizational incentives programs. Future research should
investigate the effects of employee participation on firm performance.
Our sample includes a wide range of firms, in terms of size, profitability, and industry.
Future research focusing on a particular industry may shed additional light on how HRM control
is conducted "from the top" and the effects on the firm's subsequent performance. However,
given that this is one of the first studies focusing on HRM "from the top" in IPO firms, we think
that the multi-industry focus has advantages for purposes f generalization.
Another limitation of this study is survival bias as a result of our sample size diminishing
over time due to mergers, acquisitions, and failure. Thus, the results are biased by the fact that
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they are based on the sample of firms that not only went public but that were able to survive in
their current forms throughout the period of time that we study. However, this bias, to some
extent, strengthens the results of the paper because we have eliminated additional variance in
the dependent variable (due to bankruptcy and buyouts). Thus, our sample suffers from
somewhat reduced variance in performance, which then decreases the likelihood of finding
significant results.
In addition, there is potential bias in that many firms did not report having an HRM
function reporting to the top management team, and we do not know whether that omission is
the result of their not having HRM, having it "buried" in a lower level HRM department, or
deciding not to include that information in the prospectus. Given the strict reporting
requirements for the prospectus, we suspect that most firms would report the existence of the
department if it did indeed appear within the responsibilities of the top management group, but
we have no guarantee of this. Future research is needed to clarify how HRM control is being
handled in firms where the HRM function is not reported.
One last concern is the issue of causality. Even though our research design is
longitudinal in nature, studying how events at the time of the IPO predict changes in firm
performance, the issue of causality can still be questioned. For example, consider the results for
profit sharing and stock purchase plans. The positive effect for stock purchase plans on growth
in number of employees may be associated with the fact that companies instituting these plans
knew they planned to hire large numbers of employees, and they used the stock purchase plan
successfully to attract those employees. At the same time, profit sharing plans may be used by
firms that expect to have low sales growth. They may be trying to improve firm performance
through efficiency gains, thus implementing profit sharing to create an environment where
employees improve quality and efficiency. This may explain the negative relationship between
profit sharing and sales growth. Even though these arguments bring the issue of causality
somewhat into question, the longitudinal nature of our study, and the replication of results,
provide reasonable support for the relationships posited. Future studies, to more adequately
address the causality question, should consider not only the existence of the types of controls
that we studied but also the reasons that firms are implementing these systems.
Conclusion
Even though there are several limitations to this study, we believe that it makes
important contributions to the strategic HRM research and to the fields of strategy, organization
theory, entrepreneurship, and small business management. Although the study was conducted
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with a unique sample, it is possible that the results generalize to larger firms that are undergoing
change. If the underlying process is control over all employees, there is no reason to believe
that this issue is not just as essential to larger firms as to IPO firms. To quote Simons (1995:
80), "a fundamental problem facing managers in the 1990s is how to exercise adequate control
in organizations that demand flexibility, innovation, and creativity." Thus, our findings might
generalize equally well to divisions or business units of rapidly changing corporations.
Snell and Youndt (1995: 712) recently stated that "organizational performance is the
raison d'etre for HRM control - its mismanagement can lead to confusion, inefficiency, and the
like…"  We agree with that statement, and our research attempted to extend the boundaries of
"HRM control" beyond the confines of the policies and practices of the human resource
department. By doing so, we have suggested another approach for strategic HRM research. On
one hand, research has been anchored in the HRM department; we have placed another
anchor in the strategic HRM literature by focusing on top management decisions about HRM
control over all employees. There is quite a bit of work to be done between these two positions,
and we think that work represents the "process issue," and that exploring those important issues
requires additional research.
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